This article analyses the situation since the annexation of Krim by current leadership in Kremlin. It presents some possible scenarios of further development of RussiaUkraine relations. The paper also analyses contemporary Russian foreign strategy towards the World of the Western Liberal Democracies.
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OALib Journal inflation rate of the country is approximately 11.5%, the exchange rate of the Russian ruble to the US dollar by February 2015 was about 68:1. Investments in Russia during the time of the sanctions have decreased by about 45%. Let us recall that the share of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Russia in relation to the world annual GDP in 2014 was about 2.9%, which amounts to only 6% of the total annual GDP of the NATO countries.
The standpoint of the American and European political and scholarly community is shaped around two very important elements. The first of these may be defined as civilizational. It is related to one of the key strategies launched by Europe and supported by the US immediately after the end of the Cold War, namely, the expansion of the European Union. In the strictly civilizational aspect, EU expansion aims to restore Europe's civilizational identity, which was partially lost during the Cold War, by integrating those parts of Europe, for instance Eastern Europe, which have always belonged to the prefer to call this "a striving towards European civilizational, economic, political and cultural identity". No nation should be denied the right to be part of Europe as long as it identifies itself as European in its culture and civilization, in its desire and will to be part of Europe.
The second element is geopolitical and geostrategic. Its early herald was Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the strategists of American Cold War policy. He stated and theoretically developed it for the first time in the start of President Clinton's second presidential term. In his book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (written in 1995-96 and published in 1997), and in hundreds of articles and interviews given for television in the US and Europe, Brzezinski states: "Ukraine... is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Without Ukraine, Russia may continue to strive for imperial status but will turn into a primarily Asiatic imperial state, getting involved... in exhausting conflicts with the rising Central Asiatic countries, who would hardly reconcile themselves to the loss of their newly obtained independence and would be supported by friendly Islamic states to the south. China would also probably oppose any revival of Russian dominance over Central Asia..." ([3] , p. 57).
In Eurasia, defined by Brzezinski as a "grand chessboard", Ukrainian-Russian relations are of exceptional geostrategic importance and are a factor that may open or close the horizon to American global dominance over the world. The issue can be expressed R. Kanchev 
4/22
OALib Journal in the following maxim formulated by Brzezinski: "If Moscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia"( [3] , p. 57).
Here, the famous American strategist is not saying anything new, as he is leaning on the views regarding Eurasia formulated more than a hundred years ago by the founder of European geopolitics, Sir Halford Mackinder. Studying the question of global dominance, Mackinder reached the conclusion that the Eurasian continent was of crucial importance in this regard. He defined world power with reference to three areas on the map, which he considered to be of exceptional strategic importance: "East Europe", "the Heartland", and "Eurasia" ("the World-Island"). The geopolitical correlation be- 
The Kremlin and the Crisis
As paradoxical as it might seem at first glance, Russian strategists and politicians repose on approximately the same geopolitical arguments. The Kremlin is perfectly aware that EU membership would impart to the Ukraine a different historical dynamism from that of the political, economic, and cultural development of Russia or of Central Asia. Leaving or abruptly distancing itself from Asia and getting closer to Europe is a basic political motivation underlying the developments in Ukraine since the so-called Orange billion, in 2013 the Chinese leadership spent 171 billion dollars on defense and defense research, while Russia spent 84.8 billion. Thus, a second strategic direction for expanding Moscow's global influence was strongly restricted by China's economic breakthrough and its ambitions to become a global superpower. In the middle and long term, Beijing will endeavor to prevent any foreign power from establishing geostrategic, military, political, and economic dominance in Southeast Asia. This means that, to the great displeasure of today's political elite in the Kremlin, on the south and southeast, Russia is in fact facing a powerful economic and military rival that is no less ambitious than the EU and NATO are at Russia's west. The 400 billion dollar agreement signed in July R. Kanchev
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OALib Journal 2014 between Moscow and Beijing for the construction of a new pipeline supplying energy sources to China can hardly change the basic characteristics of their rivalry. The leading world research centers and experts assess that there is a high probability this agreement will prove unprofitable for Russia. It is obvious that, given the situation in the beginning of the 21 st century and the leading economic and political world trends, the Kremlin will find it hard to implement projects involving a special leadership role for Russia on the international stage. Russia continues to be a country whose basic foreign policy tool is production and trade with energy sources and, of course, the enlargement of its military, and particularly strategic nuclear missile, potential. Indisputably, the crisis between Ukraine and Russia has a serious impact on stability in the region and is increasing the sensitivity of all the neighboring countries. The most important characteristic of this crisis is that it has the potential to radically redefine the global relations established after the end of the Cold War.
Geopolitical Trends and Consequences
In the short-term and middle-term perspective, the most important geopolitical trends and consequences of the crisis are the following:
1) The crisis has given additional impetus to the growing military rivalry between Russia on one hand and the US and NATO on the other.
2) The crisis has provoked intensified economic rivalry between Russia and the Western democracies. The sanctions imposed by the US and the EU on Russia are a new element of this rivalry.
3) The crisis has outlined the initial parameters of a confrontation of values (ideolo- 6) The crisis has provided an additional motive for developing the economic alliance, strongly growing in recent years, between the US, the European Union, Japan, Canada, and South Korea. that this course will lead to funding additional military programs, means of intelligence and control, anti-missile programs, etc. The other world powers will probably follow a reciprocal course, which means that the growth of military budgets of the US, China, Russia, EU, Japan, and other important states will continue in the middle-term and long-term perspective (see Table 1 ).
8) The crisis in Ukraine has had one more important geopolitical result. In the vague, disputed, strategically incomplete polycentricity of the modern world, this continuing crisis has introduced an element of bipolarity. A. Arbatov, from the Russian Academy of Sciences, has designated it as "asymmetric polycentricism". 
Scenarios
When studying complex social-political processes, situations and trends, the hardest part of analysis is predicting what is yet to happen. The usual procedure in such cases is to point out the closest possible variants (scenarios) for the development of events.
However, the scenarios elaborated by analysts hardly ever materialize. There is a countless number of factors and of the oretically possible variants in social reality. That R. Kanchev 9/22 OALib Journal is why prognostic scenarios primarily represent attempts at outlining hypothetically possible situations linked to some most probable combination of currently operative factors. Reality can never be grasped beforehand in the version that will actually be realized. Of the hundreds of theoretically defined possibilities, only one will occur in reality. Hence, to list scenarios is part of the analysis of the phenomenon, event, process.
Based on the geopolitical factors and trends listed above, we will define three possible, and to some degree probable, scenarios for the development of the crisis. Our main goal, however, is to use the scenario tools in order to "describe" a hypothetically possible development of the Russia-Ukraine crisis in the context of the relations between the Kremlin and the Western liberal democracies. But the geostrategic focus of study will remain the same: the Ukraine-Russia crisis represents an attempt to redefine strategic relations a quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War. "The world is full of contradictions today… Sadly, there is no guarantee and no certainty that the current system of global and regional security is able to protect us from upheavals. This system has become seriously weakened, fragmented and deformed. It is my conviction that we could not take this mechanism of checks and balances that we built over the last decades, sometimes with such effort and difficulty, and simply tear it apart without building anything in its place. Otherwise we would be left with no instruments other than brute force. What we needed to do was to carry out a rational reconstruction and adapt it the new realities in the system of international relations. But the United States, having declared itself the winner of the Cold War, saw no need for this. Instead of establishing a new balance of power, essential for maintaining order and stability, they took steps that threw the system into sharp and deep imbalance ( How will the USA and EU behave if this scenario is realized and continued in the middle term and long term? There are two possible options.The first of these we might call a breakdown of Western strategic and political unity, and even a distancing of Europe from the USA at a certain stage. This option is realistic not only in view of the Russian strategy described above but also because the integration of the Ukrainian economy will not be a quick or easy process. Today, Ukraine is not prepared for membership in EU or in NATO. Its accession to the Europe an Union will be a long and difficult process both for the Ukrainians and for the European economy; in any case, it will be very costly in economic and political terms. Of course, after the annexation of Crimea, the return of Russia to Europe and the European road of development will be a slow and difficult process. Under this scenario, the Russian leadership will have to consent to an agreement with Ukraine, the EU and the USA, in which all sides will have to make compromises. The compromise that the Kremlin must make in order to restart relations with Europe is to acknowledge the right of the Ukrainian people to choose its own historical destiny. In other words, Russia must accept as a political reality that Ukraine wants to be a member of EU. Secondly, Russia should unconditionally recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, stop destabilizing the southeastern part of that country, and renounce its intention to fight for the autonomous status of Donetsk (with about 4 million voters) and Luhansk (1 million voters) in eastern Ukraine. Though these two regions have a predominantly Russian population, they are part of Ukrainian territory and Russia has no right to say how they should be governed. In fact, if the attempts to destabilize southeastern Ukraine continue, this will permanently drive Russia off the course-still a possible one-of a return to Europe. In addition, Moscow must expect, and accept as something normal, that Ukraine will become an EU member sometime in the period 2022-2025.
The second supporting element of an agreement between the Kremlin and the liberal democracies with regard to Ukraine is related to the security of Russia itself. In this re-R. Kanchev 13/22 OALib Journal spect, it would be fair for NATO to guarantee that Ukraine will not be accepted in the Alliance, so that NATO will not deploy elements of its military infrastructure in Ukraine.
The adoption of this second scenario by the leaders of Russia has the following advantages: 1) Russia would avoid its geopolitical, economic, etc., isolation, which can be expected to grow under the first scenario.
2) The Kremlin would continue to have the option of renewing dialogue with the US as regards the American global anti-missile defense and the further enlargement of NATO. First of all, such a project could be realized in not less than two or three decades, which would require a much more powerful economy than Russia can expect to have today and in the next decades.
Second, in order to realize such a large-scale project, the country requires a favorable military-strategic environment, such as would permit reducing defense costs to a minimum and rechanneling the free resources to spheres like the economy, education, and healthcare.
Third, the realization of the "Eurasian project" requires a lasting peace and mutually Sixth, the more Russia tries to create division in Europe, the more obvious it will be for Europeans that they need the EU and should strengthen their collective defense with the US, as well as revitalize NATO. Russia will have time to make up for its high On the other hand, President Putin's severe criticism of the EU and USA, and his defining the "Eurasian Union" as an alternative to the liberal democracies, places Russia in a very hard position with regard to the highly industrialized world of the liberal democracies, which has an enormous advantage in the sphere of high technologies and has made powerful breakthroughs in almost all the fundamental directions of modern science. In fact, in undertaking the formation of the so-called Eurasian Union, the Kremlin is confronted with two powerful economic, military, strategic and political centers of power: 1) China, which is the world's second most powerful economy and harbors ambitions for world leadership in the near future, and 2) the powerful economic alliance between the USA-European Union-Japan-CanadaSouth Korea, which is intensively consolidating, especially after the annexation of Crimea, and which has behind it the only important military union today, NATO.
Assessed in this context, the "Eurasian Union" scenario implies that Russia will be involved in a very hard struggle for global influence, while lacking, at present, any significant strategic, economic or military allies. This would be a battle against two economic giants: China, with its annual GNP of about 9.1 trillion US dollars, and the alliance between the US, EU, Japan, etc., with a total annual GNP of over 40 trillion US dollars. We recall that Russia's annual GNP is about 1.4 -1.5 trillion US dollars. While Russia's share of the world economy is about 2.9%, that of the EU is around 24% -25%, of China is 13%, etc. Russia's military budget for 2013 was more than 15 times less than the combined military budget of EU, USA and Japan. Will Russia be able to balance these strategic, economic and military characteristics if it enters a new spiral of economic, military-strategic and political confrontation? In 2007, I published a monograph entitled The Paradox of Russian Democracy. As is customary in such cases, I invited friends and colleagues to the presentation of the book. In the course of the discussion on the book and on the topic of the study, I was very impressed by the assessment of a young diplomat from the French embassy in Sofia. He had read the book carefully and wanted to talk to me. In the course of our conversation, I understood that he was impressed by precisely that part of the analysis that I too considered central to the book. When I asked him what he found most interesting in the book, he abandoned diplomatic caution and said to me straightforwardly : "I was most strongly impressed by the part of your analysis in which you point out that Russia is strongly pressured by the West, so that the country's ability to make an honorable response is strongly reduced. Hence follows the very logical conclusion drawn in the book, that when 'cornered', Russia is prepared to do anything to restore its prestige as a world power, which it lost after the Cold War..." The French diplomat had understood something very important that I had tried to explain-as far as possible in a monograph-namely, that Western pressure on Russia has a limit, it cannot be without bounds.
In fact, this is where the most important part begins in the assessment of the Ukraine-Russia crisis. I am referring to the strategic capacity of the political decisionmaking elite in the Kremlin, to the strategic context created after the annexation of Crimea and the growing pressure brought to bear on Putin. If the situation continues and pressure grows stronger in the following years, there are three basic strategic resources upon which the Kremlin will be forced to build its balance with respect to the economic and nuclear missile power of the US and NATO. In a possible prolonged confrontation with the world of the Western democracies, Russia will rely on: 1) its strategic special-purpose nuclear forces (first and second-strike forces); 2) its economy, built upon an almost unlimited supply of energy sources, and 3) its enormous territory.
The well-known political analyst of the realist school, John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago), is right that the Russian president, unlike his American counterpart, is acting like a realist in the crisis [10] . In the realist perspective, the annexation of Crimea, which is entirely incompatible with the principles of international law and the UN Charter, is a purely strategic move aimed at restoring the strategic symmetry that was NATO to the detriment of Russia, then, as an offensive realist, he would seek to restore that balance. But since Russia is technologically not equipped to build its own antimissile defense of the American type, nor to establish a high tech aerospace system for intelligence and early warning against nuclear missile attack, then the "containment" priority in this context would in fact be to increase the capacity and effectiveness of the means for first and second nuclear strike as well as the announced doctrine of preventive nuclear strike. That was done in new Military doctrine of Russian federation. If, however, we carefully read the texts that present the new Russian war doctrine, we will see that what they define as a "preventive nuclear strike" is essentially a first nuclear strike, since the circumstances in which Russia is obliged to defend its national security and make a preventive nuclear strike are defined all too broadly. Hence, in the context of increasing confrontation with the West, following their "containment" doctrine, the Russians will foremost develop their nuclear first-strike capacity. Under conditions of an anti-missile system that is in a weak or "critical" state, this is the only possible option for the Kremlin and is also justified from a political point of view. Evidently, this standpoint is perceived by the Russian political and military elite around Putin as being symmetrical with the pressure exercised by the West to draw Ukraine out of the Kremlin's zone of influence and eventually accept it into NATO and the EU.
The basic theoretical principle of the realist school is balance of power (rivalry).
Realists view the global political stage as characterized by "anarchy". This anarchy is systematically generated in the world, and the only "instance" capable of containing (balancing) it is the power of each state.
Analyzed from a structural realistic perspective, the pressure put on Russia will generate a strategy of response based on the tendencies and realities indicated above. If this is so, the Kremlin can be expected in the coming years to sharply increase its military strategic potential and to restructure the Russian economy in favor of the military industrial complex. The results of the other two geostrategic realities will be integrated into a policy subordinated to this priority. In assessing the possible conduct of the Moscow political elite, we should take into consideration that the stronger the pressure exercised by the US and the Western democracies on Russia, the more insistently will the military and political circle around President Putin seek a symmetrical response to that pressure. Given the impossibility to base this response on Russia's relatively weak economy, its corrupt business elite isolated from the West, and its gross national product obtained mainly from production, transport and trade with energy sources, the focus will be on the country's military-industrial complex, armed forces and the development of an offensive nuclear ballistic missile potential. In the middle-term perspective, this strategy will generate certain negative consequences for the political development of the EU, and in the long term, it will lead to conflict between Russia on the one side and Europe and America on the other. American foreign policy in the last ten or twelve years, we will easily find that there has been a gradual escalation of confrontation in the relations between the two countries.
For more than 15 years, the Kremlin and Washington have been irreconcilably opposed on the most important strategic issues: NATO enlargement, the US constructing a high tech anti-missile defense system and stationing it in Europe, the enlargement of the EU, etc.
Taking into consideration all the facts and tendencies analyzed above, we will easily reach the conclusion that the Western democracies and the US must be prepared for a new as well as long strategic rivalry with Russia. For the Russians, this rivalry has already begun, and the Russian strategy has already been defined in terms of its key parameters and elements. The western democracies need to elaborate a new containment strategy that takes into account the strategic context following the annexation of Cri- Russia is the Christian East, which in the course of two centuries has been under the strong influence of the West and whose cultured classes assimilated every
Western idea. The fate of the Russian people has been an unhappy one and full of suffering, it has developed at a catastrophic tempo, through interruptions and change of the type of civilization. In spite of the opinion of Slavophils, there is no organic unity in Russian history" ( [12] , pp. 7-8).
Conclusion
Probably due to these particularities of both the Russian people and the political elites that have governed Russia in the last centuries, the relations of this territorially largest country in the world are equally ambivalent both towards the East and towards the West. This ambivalence is constantly generating the paradox of Russian historical and geopolitical destiny, which today, in the beginning of the 21 st century, the Russian political elite is once again trying to resolve. As in all previous attempts, Russia is again trying to be different, and not part of Western civilization.
